From Satellite to Strip‑Rows: China and Vietnam’s Race to Reclaim the South China Sea

Sat Jun 13 2026 15:06:30 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)

Antelope Reef’s dramatic transformation and Vietnam’s response illustrate a new era of maritime competition, reshaping the region’s strategic landscape and diplomatic calculus.

In the last six months, Antelope Reef—a previously almost‑underwater feature in the South China Sea—has grown into a 6‑square‑kilometre island through megasized dredging, signalling China’s arms‑race style of asserting ownership. Vietnam, too, has accelerated reclamation on several reefs, matching China’s engineering pace. As these two powers expand their footholds, other claimants face a fragmented, non‑binding environment where power dynamics tilt toward China and the balance of diplomacy becomes increasingly conditional on effective local behaviour rather than multilateral treaties.

Antelope Reef rises from undersea calm to concrete beach in six months

Antelope Reef, once a teardrop‑shaped, almost‑submerged reef in the north‑western South China Sea, has been transformed into a gleaming 2.3‑square‑mile strip of solid land. According to satellite imagery, millions of tonnes of sand have been dredged and deposited, creating a crescent of white sand dotted with buildings. The operation, carried out by cutter‑suction dredgers capable of picking up 6,000 cubic metres per hour – the ‘world’s largest fleet’ – seems to set a record for speed and scale.

China’s expansion across disputed islands

China’s land reclamation on Antelope Reef, part of the Paracel archipelago that it has controlled since 1974, mirrors similar projects on Philippine‑controlled Mischief, Fiery Cross and Subi reefs in the Spratly chain, where sizeable islands now host airstrips and military installations. These hard‑land “new islands” amplify China’s claim to the entire nine‑dash line, a demarcation it draws across the sea.

Vietnam follows suit instead of confronting

Vietnam, which has down‑scaled public anti‑Chinese rhetoric but maintained diplomatic ties with Beijing, has begun writing its own toe‑knots in the sea. Over the past three years, according to the Asian Maritime Transparency Initiative, Vietnam has dredged at least 20 reefs, creating over 11 square kilometres of reclaimed land and 11 new harbours—roughly half of China’s reclaimed area. It is also installing navigation beacons and other infrastructure, signalling a “join‑them‑if‑you‑can’t‑beat‑them” strategy.

Other claimants left in a race‑car dilemma

The Philippines, whose sovereignty claims were upheld at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 2016, now relies on US naval Freedom‑of‑Navigation Operations and local coastguard clashes to balance China’s might, albeit with limited practical effect. The ASEAN consortium has repeatedly failed to produce a binding code of conduct, and China largely ignores its commitments. This fragmentation leaves all states—with China as the assertive leader—in a “every country for itself” scenario.

Consequently, the tactical and political landscape of the South China Sea has shifted from a hopeful multilateral dialogue to a pragmatic, unregulated contest where rapid land reclamation and militarisation dictate terms. While power dynamics still favour China, Vietnam’s measured accumulation of bases and harbour facilities illustrates a pragmatic path for other claimants seeking to secure their own strategic footholds without escalating regional tensions.

Graphics by Arvin Supriyadi, Aghnia Adzkia