A secret Russian-funded network is attempting to disrupt upcoming democratic elections in an eastern European state, the BBC has found.
Using an undercover reporter, we discovered the network promised to pay participants if they posted pro-Russian propaganda and fake news undermining Moldova's pro-EU ruling party ahead of the country's 28 September parliamentary ballot.
Participants were paid to find supporters of Moldova's pro-Russia opposition to secretly record - and also to carry out a so-called poll. This was done in the name of a non-existent organisation, making it illegal. The results of this selective sampling, an organiser from the network suggested, could lay the groundwork to question the outcome of the election.
The results of the so-called poll, suggesting the ruling party will lose, have already been published online.
In fact, official polls suggest the ruling Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) founded by President Maia Sandu is currently ahead of the pro-Russian Patriotic Electoral Bloc (BEP).
We have found links between the secret network and Moldovan oligarch Ilan Shor - sanctioned by the US for the Kremlin's malign influence operations and now a fugitive in Moscow. The UK has also sanctioned him for corruption.
We have also found links between the network and a non-profit organisation (NGO) called Evrazia.
Evrazia has connections to Mr Shor and was sanctioned by the UK, US and EU for allegedly bribing Moldovan citizens to vote against EU membership last year.
In 2024 the focus of [Ilan Shor's] campaign was money. This year the focus is disinformation, Moldova's chief of police, Viorel Cernauteanu, told the BBC World Service.
Moldova may be small, but sandwiched between Ukraine, and EU-member Romania, it has strategic significance for both Europe and the Kremlin, experts say.
The World Service infiltrated the network - coordinated on the messaging app Telegram - through a link sent to us by a whistleblower.
This gave us a crucial insight into how an anti-democratic propaganda network operates.
Our undercover reporter Ana, and 34 other recruits, were asked to attend secret online seminars which would prepare operatives. With titles like How to go from your kitchen to national leader, they seemed to serve as a vetting process.
Our reporter was then contacted by a network co-ordinator called Alina Juc. Ms Juc's social media profile says she is from Transnistria, a separatist region of eastern Moldova loyal to Moscow, and her Instagram shows she has made multiple trips to Russia over the past few years.
Ms Juc told Ana she would be paid 3,000 Moldovan lei ($170, £125) a month to produce TikTok and Facebook posts in the run-up to the election, and that she would be sent the money from Promsvyazbank (PSB) - a sanctioned Russian state-owned bank.
Ana and the other recruits were trained to produce social media posts using ChatGPT and given specific instructions on the kind of misleading content to create.
Social media campaigns are now frequently central to national elections. Throughout our undercover exercise with the network, we only shared posts which were factually accurate, while monitoring the broader network's deceptive behavior.
This investigation underlines the increasing importance of information warfare in shaping public perception and electoral outcomes, especially in regions influenced by geopolitical tensions.