In brief
Two Russian men allegedly working for Ukraine’s intelligence service disclose how they assist in covert attacks on Russia’s military infrastructure. One, identified as Ivan, describes his role in arranging drone strikes and gathering intelligence inside Russia. The other, called Foma, runs an undercover volunteer network from Poland, coordinating surveillance of Russian officials without carrying out attacks himself. While Ukrainian authorities confirm the use of covert agents, the exact scope and legitimacy of these operations remain unverified, and they face both legal and security risks within Russia. The revelations highlight the complex loyalties and clandestine dynamics shaping the ongoing conflict.
Two Russian men, who appear to be working for Ukraine’s military intelligence agency, have provided rare, first‑hand insights into sabotage missions aimed at Russia’s military assets. The men—referred to here as Ivan and Foma—describe operations ranging from drone attacks on strategic bombers to the surveillance of senior military officials.
Ivan claims to have been involved in planning Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian airfields and munitions factories. He shared video footage with an independent Polish journalist that depicts him hiding explosives near a Russian military airfield, noting that if detected he would face charges of terrorism and decades in prison.
Foma, living in exile in Poland, runs a network of undercover volunteers inside Russia. According to him, the network collects detailed information on potential targets provided by Ukraine’s GUR (General Staff’s Intelligence Directorate) and conducts surveillance missions. He emphasizes that his volunteers never carry out physical attacks, claiming that intelligence is passed on to Ukrainian operatives only.
The GUR has acknowledged the existence of both men, but it admits that it cannot confirm the full extent of their involvement. When asked about the reliability of Ivan, a GUR handler reportedly responded, “I am not sure of anyone, except myself.” This ambiguity leaves the operations unverified from an external standpoint.
Ukraine has publicly described its strategy as coordinated drone attacks on what it calls legitimate targets within Russia, recognizing that secret agents play a role. Past incidents, such as the alleged role of Ukrainian intelligence in the 2024 killing of Lt Gen Igor Kirillov, illustrate the broader pattern of targeted killings, though the agency rarely admits responsibility.
Both men stressed that they oppose both the war in Ukraine and President Putin’s regime, believing that the regime’s survival is tied to the war’s outcome. Ivan told the journalist that “the regime might fall if Russia loses the war” and that their work “tries to speed this up.”
Security risks are high for anyone operating inside Russia. Ivan recalls an incident where a roadside inspection stopped his car, yet he carried homemade explosives without being detected. Both he and Foma avoid direct contact with other operatives, a strategy he calls "no clear structure" to minimize the risk of group detection.
The revelations highlight the blurred lines of loyalty and espionage amid the Russo‑Ukrainian conflict, showing how individuals on both sides navigate clandestine networks and the personal dangers that accompany them.
