Since taking de facto control of the Kingdom in 2017, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) has positioned Vision 2030 as a cornerstone of Saudi Arabia’s intention to become a diversified, knowledge‑based economy. The plan included a series of high‑concept projects that were marketed as the “future of the world”, most prominently NEOM – an $500 billion network of ultra‑modern hubs – and its flagship linear city, The Line, intended to stretch some 161 kilometres with zero cars and 100 % walkability.
Those projects were financed largely from the Kingdom’s sovereign wealth fund, the Public Investment Fund (PIF), whose $1 trillion reserves had traditionally been oil‑dependent. The PIF’s wealth was highly visible in glossy marketing material that made the projects a statement of national ambition, as well as a “sportswash” for the broader kingdom – attracting high‑profile sporting events such as the LIV Golf tour and the upcoming 2034 World Cup.
The audacity of Vision 2030, however, has been challenged by a series of economic and geopolitical shocks. A sharp plunge in crude prices has squeezed Saudi revenue; the ongoing war in the Middle East and associated sanctions and diplomatic fallout have tightened access to foreign capital and made many of the projects harder to finance. Reports suggest that tangible investment in NEOM’s blue‑sky projects never reached the levels expected by the crown prince, and that the cost of Te line‑based infrastructure, high‑tech factories and the ski resort Trojena has risen disproportionately.
In the face of these constraints, Riyadh has begun to scale back or cancel projects. The Line has been re‑imagined from a sci‑fiction linear city into a series of smaller, more achievable streets; the 50 billion‑dollar Cube clean‑room complex, a building that could have housed more than 20 Empire State Buildings, was withdrawn. Trojena’s artificial ski slopes and man‑made lake have been deemed unsustainable and the Asian Winter Games slated for 2029 have been canceled.
This move toward “practical scaling” has been framed by ministries as a rational shift toward “small wins” – projects such as Saudi’s renewable‑energy hubs, the resort of Sindalah and key upgrades in Diriyah or Qiddiya City. Experts argue that prioritizing execution over spectacle could aid long‑term investment confidence, even if it signals a retreat from the original grand vision.
The economic picture remains mixed. While the revamped focus has led to the revival of some projects and the announcement of a 2034 World Cup to be held in Riyadh, the broader goal of achieving a sustainable, diversified economy outside oil has not yet materialised on the scale promised. Unemployment relative to the youthful population remains a concern; and critics point to persistent repressive domestic policies – such as the 2017 Ritz‑Carlton purge and the 2018 Khashoggi killing – that erode the optimism touted by Vision 2030.
Nevertheless, domestically, many young Saudis view Vision 2030’s larger gestures (women’s driving rights, increased public entertainment options) as a cultural turning point, even if the intended economic outcomes lag behind. Politically, Riyadh is trying to present the shift from the “fantasy” to “realism” narrative as a testament to learning from past excesses.
The next few years will test the balance between ambitious transformation and economic constraints. Stakeholders – from investors wary of political unpredictability to domestic critics pointing to social rights – will monitor whether Saudi Arabia can sustain a transformation that stays true to the vision and mindful of the state’s pragmatic limitations.
Those projects were financed largely from the Kingdom’s sovereign wealth fund, the Public Investment Fund (PIF), whose $1 trillion reserves had traditionally been oil‑dependent. The PIF’s wealth was highly visible in glossy marketing material that made the projects a statement of national ambition, as well as a “sportswash” for the broader kingdom – attracting high‑profile sporting events such as the LIV Golf tour and the upcoming 2034 World Cup.
The audacity of Vision 2030, however, has been challenged by a series of economic and geopolitical shocks. A sharp plunge in crude prices has squeezed Saudi revenue; the ongoing war in the Middle East and associated sanctions and diplomatic fallout have tightened access to foreign capital and made many of the projects harder to finance. Reports suggest that tangible investment in NEOM’s blue‑sky projects never reached the levels expected by the crown prince, and that the cost of Te line‑based infrastructure, high‑tech factories and the ski resort Trojena has risen disproportionately.
In the face of these constraints, Riyadh has begun to scale back or cancel projects. The Line has been re‑imagined from a sci‑fiction linear city into a series of smaller, more achievable streets; the 50 billion‑dollar Cube clean‑room complex, a building that could have housed more than 20 Empire State Buildings, was withdrawn. Trojena’s artificial ski slopes and man‑made lake have been deemed unsustainable and the Asian Winter Games slated for 2029 have been canceled.
This move toward “practical scaling” has been framed by ministries as a rational shift toward “small wins” – projects such as Saudi’s renewable‑energy hubs, the resort of Sindalah and key upgrades in Diriyah or Qiddiya City. Experts argue that prioritizing execution over spectacle could aid long‑term investment confidence, even if it signals a retreat from the original grand vision.
The economic picture remains mixed. While the revamped focus has led to the revival of some projects and the announcement of a 2034 World Cup to be held in Riyadh, the broader goal of achieving a sustainable, diversified economy outside oil has not yet materialised on the scale promised. Unemployment relative to the youthful population remains a concern; and critics point to persistent repressive domestic policies – such as the 2017 Ritz‑Carlton purge and the 2018 Khashoggi killing – that erode the optimism touted by Vision 2030.
Nevertheless, domestically, many young Saudis view Vision 2030’s larger gestures (women’s driving rights, increased public entertainment options) as a cultural turning point, even if the intended economic outcomes lag behind. Politically, Riyadh is trying to present the shift from the “fantasy” to “realism” narrative as a testament to learning from past excesses.
The next few years will test the balance between ambitious transformation and economic constraints. Stakeholders – from investors wary of political unpredictability to domestic critics pointing to social rights – will monitor whether Saudi Arabia can sustain a transformation that stays true to the vision and mindful of the state’s pragmatic limitations.
